Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
ECE Technical Reports

Electrical and Computer Engineering

1-1-2008

Inferring Undesirable Behavior from P2P Traffic
Analysis
Ruben Torres
Purdue University, rtorresg@purdue.edu

Mohammad Hajjat
Purdue University - Main Campus, mhajjat@purdue.edu

Sanjay G. Rao
Purdue University, sanjay@ecn.purdue.edu

Marco Mellia
Politecnico di Torino, mellia@tlc.polito.it

Maurizio Munafo
Politecnico di Torino, munafo@tlc.polito.it

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ecetr
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons
Torres, Ruben; Hajjat, Mohammad; Rao, Sanjay G.; Mellia, Marco; and Munafo, Maurizio, "Inferring Undesirable Behavior from P2P
Traffic Analysis" (2008). ECE Technical Reports. Paper 378.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ecetr/378

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Inferring Undesirable Behavior from P2P Traffic Analysis
Ruben Torres, Mohammad Hajjat,
Sanjay Rao

Marco Mellia, Maurizio Munafò
Politecnico di Torino

{mellia,munafo}@tlc.polito.it

Purdue University

{rtorresg,mhajjat,sanjay}@purdue.edu

ABSTRACT

P2P system developers, and actual end-users of P2P systems. Network operators may wish to identify causes for large traffic consumption, and isolate hosts that behave aggressively, for instance
transfer too much data. Knowledge of undesirable behavior and its
causes can aid P2P system developers in augmenting the design of
the systems. Finally, end-users seek to ensure that that their host is
not being exploited for malicious purposes, and care about application performance.
In this paper, we show the importance and potential of a traffic analysis approach in highlighting potential undesirable behavior of P2P
systems. While the ultimate objective is online identification of undesirable behavior, in this paper, we take a first step by focusing
on offline identification, and a semi-automated analysis methodology. Our analysis is conducted on real traffic traces collected
from a Point-of-Presence (PoP) of a nation-wide ISP. 70% (95%)
of inbound (outbound) traffic is due to eMule [21], a popular filesharing system, and the associated Kad network, one of the largest
DHT-based deployments. We analyze about 400 peers inside the
PoP, contacting about 400,000 external peers for about 24h, generating about 2TB of data. Another interesting aspect of this dataset
is the use of a modified Kad system - called KadU - within the ISP
network that was optimized by a large community of ISP users to
exploit the peculiarities of the ISP architecture.
The key challenge we faced in our study is that an exhaustive list
of potential undesirable behavior is not available to us a priori. In
addition, the intrinsic heterogeneity of P2P traffic makes it hard to
clearly distinguish undesirable behavior from normal usage. Consequently, our methodology employs a combination of data-mining
techniques, and manual inspection through domain knowledge. We
assume availability of flow-level data where flows corresponding to
the P2P system of interest are clearly identifiable. The key steps in
our approach are (i) aggregation of flow-level measurements into
per-host samples; (ii) characterization of per-host behavior using
a wide range of metrics such as the number of contacted peers,
and number of initiated flows; (iii) a clustering algorithm to identify homogeneous groups of samples; and (iv) manual inspection
of resulting clusters and interpretation using domain knowledge to
identify undesirable behavior patterns.
Our methodology reveals several interesting findings, both confirming already known types of undesirable behavior of P2P systems, as well as highlighting new patterns of undesirable behavior.
Some of our most relevant findings include:
• We show evidence of real DDoS attacks being conducted on DNS
servers by exploiting P2P systems.
• We show that stale membership information and presence of hosts
behind Network Address Translators (NATs) can result in the failure of 15% of TCP connections and 18% of UDP flows incoming
to the PoP. This may hurt peer performance, introduce unneces-

While peer-to-peer (P2P) systems have emerged in popularity in
recent years, their large-scale and complexity make them difficult
to reason about. In this paper, we argue that systematic analysis
of traffic characteristics of P2P systems can reveal a wealth of information about their behavior, and highlight potential undesirable
activities that such systems may exhibit. As a first step to this end,
we present an offline and semi-automated approach to detecting
undesirable behavior. Our analysis is applied on real traffic traces
collected from a Point-of-Presence (PoP) of a national-wide ISP in
which over 70% of the total traffic is due to eMule [21], a popular P2P file-sharing system. Flow-level measurements are aggregated into “samples” referring to the activity of each host during a
time interval. We then employ a clustering technique to automatically and coarsely identify similar behavior across samples, and
extensively use domain knowledge to interpret and analyze the resulting clusters. Our analysis shows several examples of undesirable behavior including evidence of DDoS attacks exploiting live
P2P clients, significant amounts of unwanted traffic that may harm
both P2P system and network performance, and instances where
the performance of participating peers may be subverted due to maliciously deployed servers. Identification of such patterns can benefit network operators, P2P system developers, and actual end-users
of P2P systems. Overall, the results demonstrate the importance
and potential of systematic approaches to uncovering undesirable
P2P system behavior.

1

Introduction

Peer-to-peer(P2P) systems have rapidly emerged in popularity in
the last few years, and they have matured to the point we have
recently seen several commercial offerings, including file sharing,
VoIP and multimedia applications. Recent studies [15] indicate that
over 60% of network traffic is dominated by peer-to-peer systems,
and the emergence of these systems has drastically affected traffic
usage and capacity engineering.
With the growth of P2P systems, many of which involve millions
of hosts, and complex interactions between participating peers, it
becomes critical to monitor these systems, and to ensure they are
behaving as intended. Indeed, several reports are emerging about
potential undesirable behavior exhibited by such systems, either
due to bugs or design flaws [5, 31], or due to vulnerabilities in the
system [10, 13, 20, 31]. The behavior may be undesirable either
from the perspective of the performance of the system, or in terms
of unwanted traffic (malicious or otherwise) generated by the systems.
Detecting undesirable behavior is of interest to network operators,
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sary traffic, and may unnecessarily consume significant computation resources of state-full network devices, such as firewalls or
NAT boxes.
• We show instances where maliciously deployed servers can subvert the performance of hosts participating in the P2P system.
Overall, these results confirm the presence of various patterns of
undesirable behavior in P2P systems, and demonstrate the importance and potential of a traffic-analysis approach to uncover such
patterns.

2

Methodology Overview

The methodology we propose in this paper seeks to infer undesirable behavior of P2P systems, by identifying possibly atypical traffic in a P2P system. Our methodology may be viewed as consisting
of the following steps, as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 2: The ISP infrastructure: FTTH and xDSL access,
MiniPoP, PoP and backbone layers
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of possible connections
from hosts in the MiniPop versus other hosts

gregate this information to capture per-host behavior. We conduct
our analysis at the host level since our goal is to characterize peer
activity - for instance, we are interested in capturing peers that exhibit undesirable behavior such as searching aggressively, or generating large amounts of traffic. We capture host behavior using
several metrics such as the number of active flows, the total number of received connections, and the average size of packets sent
and received. For any given host h, and in a given time window
[i∆T, (i + 1)∆T ), and for each metric fm , m = {1, 2, . . . , k},
a sample of the metric fm (h, i) is obtained for that time window.
We study host behavior in various time windows, since the host
might be demonstrating normal behavior overall, but might exhibit
interesting behavior for certain periods of time.
The next step consists of detecting interesting, and potentially undesirable patterns of behavior that hosts may exhibit. To achieve
this, samples corresponding to a given metric are fed to a clustering algorithm. In particular, we adopt a density-based clustering
algorithm - clusters are regarded as regions in the data space in
which the objects are dense, and which are separated by regions of
low object density (noise). As output of this step, we get, for each
metric, clusters of samples {fm (h, i)}. Through manual inspection
and domain knowledge, clusters are labeled as normal or possibly
interesting. Interesting samples are then correlated across hosts to
identify if they correspond to particular hosts, or are spread across
multiple hosts. In addition the analysis may rely on correlating interesting behavior across multiple related metrics.

Figure 1: Schematic overview of the proposed methodology
In our analysis, we assume that data is collected at the edge of a
network, for instance edge of an enterprise network. We assume
that flow-level records of all UDP and TCP data traversing the
network edge is available. While well-known flow level loggers
such as Cisco NetFlow [17] can be used to generate flow records,
a key requirement for our study is that flow-level records are classified based on application, and flows corresponding to the P2P
system of interest are clearly identifiable. Several techniques have
been developed for classification of traffic as P2P (for instance
[14, 18, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30]), which may be leveraged. In this paper, we use data-sets where traffic is classified through deep packet
inspection (DPI) [6, 25]. Raw packets are sniffed from the network
link of interest, and flows are passively rebuilt, and classification
is performed in an online fashion based on the application layer
payload. In our context, encrypted payload has not been a major issue, but in general one approach to deal with it is using behavioral
classifiers [12, 14, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30].
While we begin with per-flow measurement information, we ag2
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Data Set

obtained focusing on a subset of the dataset, corresponding to about
24 hours, or about 2TB of information. About 2,200 different hosts
were active in the MiniPoP, exchanging packets to about 782,000
different hosts in the Internet. Few hosts in the MiniPoP are using public IP addresses, which correspond in general to servers installed in small offices.

Traffic Volume [%]

Real traffic traces are collected from a main broadband telecommunication ISP in Europe, offering telecommunication services to
more than 5 millions families. Thanks to its fully IP architecture,
and the use of both Fiber to the Home (FTTH) and Digital Subscriber Line (xDSL) access, the ISP offers converged services over
a single broadband connection. No PSTN circuit is offered to endusers, so that only IP connectivity is adopted to offer data, VoIP
and IPTV services over the same infrastructure [7]. The very peculiar mix of FTTH and high-quality ADSL access makes the ISP
the leader in providing high speed access in its country, and the
preferred ISP among high-end users. In the rest of the section, we
present details about the ISP setup and trace collection infrastructure (Section 3.1), and present details about the P2P system traffic
in the trace (Sections 3.2, and 3.3).
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3.1 ISP Setup and Trace Collection Infrastructure
As represented in Figure 2, a Metropolitan Area Network (MAN)
Ethernet-based architecture is adopted in the last mile. Residential and small business customers are connected to a Home Access
Gateway (HAG), which offers Ethernet ports to connect PCs, the
SetTopBox and traditional phone plugs. In case of FTTH access
technology, HAGs are connected to Ethernet switches in the building basement, which are then interconnected to form Gigabit Ethernet rings. Rings are terminated at the so called MiniPoP routers,
which offers connectivity to the ISP backbone. Customers are offered a 10Mbps Half-Duplex Ethernet link. In case of ADSL access, the HAGs are connected by the DSLAM to backbone routers.
Customers are offered 1024Kbps upstream and 6Mbps or 20Mbps
downstream links.
Addressing and NATs: Both private and public addresses are offered to end users, as shown in Figure 3. A small number of hosts
(for instance, host h1 ), have public IP addresses and these hosts
have unrestricted end-to-end IP connectivity with other Internet
hosts. The vast majority of hosts (for instance hosts h2 and h3 ) are
assigned private IP addresses. Whenever such hosts communicate
with hosts in the external Internet (for instance, h5 and h6 ), the data
communication involves traversal of an ISP-wide NAT. Note however that plain end-to-end IP connectivity is offered among hosts
inside the ISP network, and communication between hosts inside
the ISP (for instance, h1 , h2 , and h3 ) does not involve NAT traversal. At the peering point, a Full-Cone NAT service [34] is implemented. This forbids any TCP connection initiated from the external Internet. However, it is possible that UDP flows initiated from
the external Internet are permitted. In particular, once a host behind a full-cone NAT (for instance, host h3 ) sends a UDP packet to
the external Internet, it can receive a UDP packet on the port from
any arbitrary external host, (for instance h6 ). Finally, in addition
to the ISP-wide NAT, individual users (for instance, host h4 ) may
also employ home NAT boxes. Host h4 cannot be contacted by any
host (unless proper configuration at the home NAT is provided).
Trace Collection: Traces have been collected at a MiniPoP router
during March and April 2008. A probe PC was used to analyze in
real time all the packets going to and coming from all the users in
the MiniPoP, and produce a flow level log that has then been postprocessed later as detailed in Sec 21 . In this paper we report results
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Figure 4: Traffic volume shares in the MiniPoP. The top plot
reports the inbound traffic, while the bottom plot reports the
outbound traffic. Only HTTP and eMule traffic is reported.
On the bottom plot, HTTP traffic is extremely small and not
visible
3.2 P2P Systems Description
The most popular P2P system used among the users in the ISP is
eMule [21], a widely deployed file sharing application. To demonstrate this, Figure 4 shows the byte-wise traffic volume percentage
as measured during about three months. The top and bottom plots
report results considering inbound and outbound traffic respectively
(i.e., bytes destined to/sourced from a host in the MiniPoP). The
two most popular protocols are HTTP and eMule, with other protocols accounting for no more than 10% of traffic. In particular,
eMule accounts for about 60-70% of traffic on the inbound traffic,
while it has a share of more than 95% on the outbound volume.
HTTP traffic is predominant only in the inbound traffic, since hosts
in the MiniPoP act as clients.
We focus our analysis on eMule traffic given its large predominance in the dataset. eMule supports both a centralized architecture, referred to as eMule network, and a DHT system, referred to as
Kad network. In particular, eMule servers do not store any file, but
they only maintain a database of files and users per file. The Kad
network is a large-scale DHT-based system based on the Kademlia [29] DHT. A Kad client looks up for both content and peers
sharing content using the DHT instead of relying on the eMule
servers. Once a client has found a peer that is sharing the desired
file, direct connections are used to download/upload the actual data
using end-to-end TCP connections; communication with the eMule
server goes preferentially over TCP, while Kad relies on UDP only.
The original eMule/Kad networks have mechanisms in place to
identify clients behind NAT, and limit the performance of such
clients when they try to download content. This impacts the performance of hosts with private IP addresses in the ISP, since a NAT
is traversed when communicating with hosts in the Internet, e.g.,
eMule servers. Given that the large majority of ISP hosts have been
given private IP addresses, the performance of eMule is severely
limited. Therefore, a community of ISP users modified the original
eMule client to form a closed P2P network called the KadU network. The network is closed in the sense that all KadU clients belong to the ISP network only. The Kad protocol has been modified,
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A flow is identified by the traditional 5-tuple. In case of TCP,
a flow starts when the SYN packet is observed. If the threeway-handshake is (not) completed, then the TCP flow is said
(un)successful. In case of UDP, a flow starts when the first packet
is observed. If (no) packet is observed in the reverse path, then the
UDP flow is said (un)answered. Flows end after no packets have
been observed for 10 minutes.
3

initiated from the Internet to the MiniPoP, but there are UDP flows
though. This is due to the full-cone NAT at the edge of the network,
as previously explained in Section 3.1.

Table 1: General Statistics
TCP
UDP
Direction
eMule
eMule/Kad/KadU
succ. connections Bytes flows
Bytes
MiniPoP to ISP
264k
512G 4.7M 820M
MiniPoP to Internet
377k
80G 412.7k 58M
ISP to MiniPoP
174k
341G 3.8M 735M
Internet to MiniPoP
0
0
208k
35M
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P2P Traffic Classification and Aggregation

4.1 Classification and Filtering of Flows of Interest
In order to correctly identify eMule and Kad/KadU traffic, we employed an approach described in [6,25] which involves deep packet
inspection (DPI). We used a passive packet analyzer that rebuilds
and tracks UDP and TCP flows. When a new flow is identified,
the DPI classifier looks at the application layer payload to identify
a set of well-known protocols. All eMule and Kad/KadU protocol messages are included, and manual tuning has been adopted
to guarantee conservative classification. While the performance of
the DPI is out the scope of this paper, we manually verified that the
false positive probability is practically negligible.
The output of the classification and flow analysis phase is a flow
level log, in which each flow that has been observed and classified
as eMule, Kad or KadU is listed, along with a list of measurements.
In particular, in this paper we exploit the following per-flow information: (i) flow id defined as <src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port,
protocol_type>; (ii) first and last packet time; (iii) number of sent
and received packets; (iv) number of sent and received bytes. Note
that the above information can be easily derived by any flow level
logger, including NetFlow [17] or IPFIX [11] running directly at
routers.

so KadU messages can only be exchanged among peers running
the modified eMule version and using IP addresses actually used
by the ISP. This ensures that a KadU client cannot operate in the
Internet. Similarly, the peer selection mechanism has been modified to preferentially connect to other KadU clients. The KadU
peers perform search operation on the KadU network by default,
rather than relying on server-based search as in the default eMule
configuration. No changes have been made to the eMule part, so
that both server and P2P protocols are the same as in the original
eMule, and the modified eMule client and original eMule client can
perfectly interoperate.
Besides avoiding the NAT issues, running the modified client has
several advantages. Indeed, it is desirable to download content
from other clients in the ISP because the large percentage of hosts
connected by FTTH access guarantees much higher upload capacity than the typical one offered by ADSL providers. Furthermore,
given that all the ISP peers are in the same European country, the
content that is available in the P2P system matches the interest of
the community, and it is easier to trade content in the closed network than in a worldwide network. For these reasons, clients in
KadU typically see much better performance than the one typically
achieved by clients in the Kad network.

4.2 Aggregating Flows into Host Samples
As described in Section 2, we aggregate flow measurements into
host metrics fm (h, i). A sample fm is obtained for host h at every
time slot i of size ∆T = 5 minutes. The latter choice enables us
to track changes in host behavior over the order of minutes, and
it is unlikely for host behavior to significantly shift over this time
period.
Given that clients could be part of either the Kad or KadU network each with very different properties, we would like to study
each system in isolation by separately aggregating Kad and KadU
flows into samples. However, while the two networks differ in the
UDP protocol used in the Kademlia DHT, both employ identical
TCP-based protocol on the data path, e.g, to exchange content.
As a consequence, the DPI classification can successfully distinguish UDP-based control messages, but the TCP-based data flows
are classified identically as eMule.
To handle this, we adopt the following heuristic. Consider a time
slot i and a host h. If UDP flows are present, then we classify the
sample as either Kad or KadU based on the classification of UDP
flows. All TCP-based metrics are then classified accordingly. In the
dataset, there are 12, 963 KadU samples and 1, 519 Kad samples. It
is possible that a time slot includes both Kad and KadU - however,
there are only 35 such samples, so that we can simply discard them.
Finally, it is possible to have samples with neither Kad nor KadU
flows, but exclusively eMule TCP connections. There are 1, 200 of
such samples, most of which are due to only 4 hosts running the
centralized server-based eMule protocol only. We do not consider
them further.

3.3 Preliminary Traffic Analysis
In the considered dataset, we identified 478 clients running KadU
inside the MiniPoP, and exchanging traffic with about 229, 000
KadU clients outside the MiniPoP. For Kad, we identified 136 clients
which were exchanging packets with about 300, 000 clients in the
Internet. Table 1 presents details on the trace characteristics.
Knowing the address space allocation for the ISP and for the MiniPoP,
we are able to classify all hosts as being in the MiniPoP, in the
ISP (but not in the MiniPoP) or in the Internet. We leverage this
classification in Table 1. Each row provides statistics about traffic exchanged between hosts in two classes. The second and third
columns give the total number of successful TCP connections classified as eMule, and the amount of bytes they carried. The last two
columns show similar numbers for UDP flows classified as eMule,
Kad or KadU.
For example, the MiniPoP to ISP row reports that (i) there was
a total of 264k eMule TCP connections initiated from inside the
MiniPoP to clients inside the ISP, which carried a total of 512GB
of data; and (ii) around 4.7 million UDP flows (classified as eMule,
Kad, or KadU) were initiated in the same direction, and about
820M B of data was exchanged.
From this table, we see that: (i) the bytes exchanged between hosts
within the ISP is much larger than the bytes going to the Internet,
for both TCP and UDP. This is due to the extensive usage of the
KadU network, and its efficiency in localizing traffic communication to within the ISP; (ii) there is a non-negligible amount of TCP
and UDP traffic exchanged with the Internet. This is because the
use of Kad clients is still prevalent. In addition, even clients that use
the KadU network may need to rely on eMule if the content cannot
be located within the ISP; and (iii) there are no TCP connections

5

Metrics

In this section, we present the list of metrics considered in this paper, which is summarized in Table 2. All the selected metrics are
very simple and intuitive metrics. Some of them have been previously proposed in the past for both traffic characterization and classification considering both P2P systems, or traditional client/server
applications. Some are specifically defined considering the sce4

nario we are facing, e.g., to highlight eventual Kad and KadU dissimilarities, or to pinpoint possible atypical behavior. Along with
flow measurements, some metrics require to know the IP addresses
of hosts inside the MiniPoP, and of all IP addresses used by the ISP.
This information can directly be included in the flow level log, or it
can be given during the log post-processing phase.
If not otherwise specified, each metric is evaluated separately for
UDP and TCP flows, given that the considered systems make use
of both protocols. When needed, TCP (UDP) will be appended to
the metric name, as appropiate. For relevant metrics, we consider
the location of the flow initiator as either being inside or outside
the MiniPoP. For ease of notation, metrics involving flows initiated
inside (outside) the MiniPoP will be prepended with the term inout
(outin) followed by the metric name.
In Section 5.1 we consider metrics general to all flows first, and
then metrics to which initiator location is specified are detailed in
Section 5.2.

Table 2: List of Metrics
avg-duration
Flows
live-conn
fract-incoming-conn
Metrics
bps-rcvd
Independent
of Flow
Data Transfer bps-sent
avg-pkt-size
Initiator
ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd
Flows
total-conn-attempts
avg-conn-per-IP
Metrics
total-peers
Dependent
Destinations dest-ports
on Flow
inout-1024-dest-ports
Initiator
failure-ratio [TCP only]
Failures outin-fract-unanswered [UDP only]
[inout, outin]
ISP
inout-ISP-to-Internet-ratio

5.1 Metrics Independent of Flow Initiator
These metrics consider various measurements that do not depend
on the location of the flow initiator. We group them in two categories, Flows, which include per-flow basic statistics and Data
transfer, which include data exchange related metrics. Given a host
h in the MiniPoP and a time slot i, we have:
• Flow related metrics: (i) avg-duration is the average duration of
flows started during time slot i; (ii) live-conn is the total number
of flows that were active during time slot i. This includes flows
that have started in the current time slot and flows that started in
previous time slots and are still active in the current one; (iii) fractincoming-conn is the ratio of flows initiated from the outside to the
Figure 5: outin-fract-unanswered is an example of multiple
total number of flows.
cluster metric
• Data Transfer related metrics: (i) bps-rcvd and bps-sent are the
average bytes per second (referred to as bps) received and sent respectively; (ii) avg-pkt-size is the average size of packets sent and
• ISP related metrics: inout-ISP-to-Internet-ratio is the ratio of
received; (iii) ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd is defined as bytes_sent−bytes_rcvd
,
bytes_sent+bytes_rcvd the number of peers within the ISP that are contacted to the total
where bytes_sent (bytes_rcvd) is the total amount of bytes sent (renumber of contacted peers.
ceived). ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd = −1 for hosts receiving data
only, while ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd = 1 for hosts that send data
6 Identifying Undesirable P2P Behavior
only.
Our goal is to identify undesirable behavior of P2P systems. The
5.2 Metrics Dependent on Flow Initiator
key challenge we faced in our study is that an exhaustive list of potential undesirable behavior is not available to us a priori. MoreIn this case, four categories of metrics have been selected:
over, the intrinsic heterogeneity of P2P traffic makes it hard to
• Flow related metrics: total-conn-attempts is the total number of
clearly identify undesirable behavior from normal usage. Conseflows initiated (inout) or received (outin). This includes both sucquently, our methodology employs a combination of data-mining
cessful and unsuccessful connections when considering TCP, and
techniques, and manual inspection through domain knowledge.
both answered and unanswered flows when considering UDP.
As a first step, we employ clustering algorithms [36] to obtain a
• Destinations related metrics: (i) avg-conn-per-IP is the ratio of
set of coarse clusters of the data. Clustering algorithms are well
all flows to the number of distinct destinations. A similar metric
known techniques in the data mining field that fall in the unsuperwas used in [26] for P2P traffic classification, in which the authors
vised machine learning category. Without the need of any training
showed that it is rare that P2P clients open concurrent connections
data, clustering algorithms aim at partitioning the data set into subto other peers; (ii) total-peers is the total number of distinct peers;
sets - called “clusters” - so that samples in the same subset share
(iii) dest-ports is the total number of distinct destination ports; (iv)
common traits, i.e., they are close to each other according to a noinout-1024-dest-ports is the total number of distinct reserved destition of distance. Clustering algorithms are often useful for outlier
nation ports, i.e., ports from 0 to 1024. Since reserved ports should
detection, where outliers may emerge as small clusters far removed
not be used by non standard application, we include this metric to
from the others. As a second step, we extensively resort to domain
highlight possible abuse.
knowledge and manual inspection to interpret the clustering results,
• Failures related metrics: (i) failure-ratio is the ratio of unsuczoom in on interesting patterns, and identify undesirable behavior.
cessful TCP flows to total TCP flows 2 (ii) outin-fract-unanswered
is the fraction of unanswered UDP flows to total UDP flows.

6.1 Density based Clustering

2
Note that unsuccessful TCP flows cannot be classified as eMule,
since no payload can be inspected. Hence, we take a conservative
approach and only consider as eMule related failures those that are
directed to the default eMule port.

Among clustering algorithms, density based clustering uses the concept of dense region of objects. In such schemes, dense regions of
points are considered a cluster and low density regions are considered as noise. In particular, we selected DBScan [23], since it is
5

Table 3: DBScan Sensitivity
Minpts
1%
5%
10%
20%
40%
60%
0.01 3(4%) 2 (15%) 2 (16%) 2 (19%) 1 (49%) 0 (100%)
0.05 2 (1.1%) 2 (2.3%) 2 (3.7%) 2 (4%) 1 (41%) 0 (100%)
ǫ 0.1 2 (0.5%) 2 (0.9%) 2 (1%) 2 (1.2%) 1 (40.8%) 0 (100%)
0.2 2 (0%) 2 (0.1%) 2 (0.1%) 2 (0.2%) 2 (0.3%) 0 (100%)
0.5 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (33%)

Figure 6: inout-avg-conn-per-IP-TCP is an example of single
cluster metric
well known and offers several advantages: it automatically determines the number of clusters (contrary for example to the k-means
algorithm); it is robust to noise, i.e., isolated samples; and finally it
does not have any bias versus any cluster shape.
Intuitively, DBScan forms cluster grouping together points that falls
in a dense region of the metric space. Given a point in the data set,
density is estimated as number of points within a specified radius
of that point. There are three types of points: (i) core point is a
point that has more than Minpts around it within a distance d ≤ ǫ;
(ii) border point is a point that is within a distance ǫ of a core point
but is not a core point; (iii) noise point is any point that is neither a
core point nor a border point. With these definitions in mind, DBScan puts two core points in the same cluster if they are within a
distance ǫ of each other. Also, a border point within distance ǫ of a
core point is put in the same cluster as the core point. Finally, noise
points are labeled as such.
For each metric m, we consider the set of all samples Fm = {fm (h, i)}
collected during the desired observation period, for each host h and
for all time slots i. We apply clustering algorithms to each metric
individually, and define the distance between two samples as simply d = |fm (h1 , i1 ) − fm (h2 , i2 )|. We choose to apply clustering
on individual metrics rather than on multidimensional spaces for
several reasons. First, each metric sample distribution is generally
very skewed, which makes clustering difficult per se. When considering a multidimensional space obtained as the Cartesian product of skewed metrics, the result of clustering is hard to predict and
control, e.g., to impose a coarse clustering. Further, distance in
multidimensional space may be difficult to define, since each metric have very different support, e.g., x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, ∞)
make it hard to appreciate the spread on the x dimension. Note
that this is typical of our scenario, e.g., considering metrics like
outin-fract-unanswered and avg-duration. Although dimensional
reduction and normalization techniques exist, the outcome from
them may be difficult to control and interpret. Finally, possible
undesirable behavior can be already identified when considering a
single metric, while the correlation between undesirable behavior
across different metrics can be later checked exploiting the domain
knowledge of the targeted scenario.
We illustrate the operation of the DBScan algorithm, and the impact of the parameters Minpts and ǫ with an example. Consider
Figure 5 which shows the histogram of outin-fract-unanswered for
UDP traffic considering the Kad dataset. More than 650 samples
(around 36%) fall in the range [0, 0.08], while more than 1, 300
(around 58%) samples fall in the range [0.98, 1]. Table 3 reports the
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DBScan result when applied to the dataset in Figure 5, for different
values of Minpts and ǫ parameters. Each cell shows the number of
clusters produced by DBScan, and the fraction of the samples that
are classified as noise. For instance, for ǫ=0.1, and Minpts=40%
of the total samples, there is 1 cluster, with 40.8% of the samples
classified as noise. For large values of Minpts (60%) we see that 0
clusters are produced for most ǫ values, and all 100% of the samples
are classified as noise. This is because no point has a sufficiently
large neighborhood or density to be classified as a core point. As
we decrease Minpts however, the noise region decreases, and clusters emerge. For ǫ=0.1, and for Minpts 20% or lower, 2 clusters
are always identified, which matches our intuition from the Figure.
We observe that DBScan is relatively robust to the input parameter
setting in our scenario, and there exist several parameter settings
that can achieve a reasonable coarse clustering.
We employ a simple iterative search heuristic to identify a Minpts
and ǫ that can achieve a reasonable coarse clustering. Our heuristic seeks to obtain a clustering result with noise region that is non
empty but not too large, e.g., a small percentage of samples. The
reason for requiring a small number of samples to be classified as
noise is to avoid cases where many smaller clusters are merged
into one larger cluster with no noise region (for instance, ǫ=0.5,
Minpts=20% in Table 3), or to prevent clusters being formed with
a small number of points. We start with ǫ = 0.1, M inpts = 50%
and keep decreasing Minpts, until the resulting noise falls in the
target region. Then, ǫ is increased until the noise region is reduced
too much. Large ǫ enlarge clusters adding noise points and eventually merging clusters, while small ǫ results in possible splitting of
clusters that might not be of interest. The results we present employ a target noise region of 6%, but we have found that DBScan is
relatively robust to the choice in our scenario, and any value in the
range 2-10% would provide very similar results.
6.2 Interesting Regions Selection using Domain Knowledge
After getting the output from DBScan, intuitively we could consider the samples in the noise region to be the interesting ones.
However, atypical or malicious behavior could be so prevalent to
form a whole cluster, and hence, only considering the noise points
may cause information loss. We therefore believe the outlier region
should be selected based on domain knowledge from the network
operator, P2P developer, or the end-user. In particular, applying
DBScan to each metric, two possible cases are obtained: (i) metrics exhibiting a single cluster and a noise region; and (ii) metrics
exhibiting multiple clusters and one or more noise regions.
In cases where the metric exhibits a single cluster, the interesting
region typically coincides with the noise region. To illustrate this,
consider Figure 6, which shows the histograms of values taken by
the inout-avg-conn-per-IP-TCP metric considering the Kad dataset.
As shown in the Figure, when DBScan is employed, a single cluster
(C1) is produced which includes all samples in the range [0, 1.4),
and a noise region, including samples in [1.4, 3]. The noise region
is interesting since eMule clients are not expected to open more
than one TCP connection with the same host. We have further investigated the samples in this region, and have found them to due

run in a friendly environment in which no throttling is imposed on
P2P traffic by the ISP. Hence there is no need to try masquerading
P2P traffic by using random ports. On the contrary, Kad clients run
in the Internet, in which ISPs may block P2P traffic, and there is
a greater tendency for users to adopt random ports (and possibly
protocol obfuscation).
• In contrast to KadU, Kad clients see almost no incoming TCP
traffic due to a NAT at the edge of the ISP: The metric fract-incomingconn-TCP is equal to 0 for almost all Kad samples, while it has a
bell distribution for KadU samples. The reason for this is that there
is a NAT at the edge of the ISP, as discussed in Section 3.2, which
forbids incoming TCP connections from the Internet. Interestingly,
Kad clients can still receive UDP flows initiated in the Internet.
This is because the NAT at the edge of the ISP is a Full Cone NAT.
• KadU clients exchange much more data, with a prominent seedlike behavior: When the bps-rcvd and bps-sent metrics are considered, the 90%ile for KadU samples is 164Kbps and 674Kbps respectively. In contrast, the 90%ile for Kad samples is only 36Kbps
and 54Kbps. The much higher performance in KadU is due to the
effectiveness of the optimizations in the KadU client, as well as the
large installation of high-speed FTTH users in the ISP. Further, we
noticed that KadU clients present a predominant seed-like behavior (for example, the 90%ile of the bps-sent metric is 4 times the
90%ile of the bps-rcvd metric). We believe this may be attributed
to the high-speed upload bandwidth of the FTTH users in the ISP.

to hosts being attacked by fake servers, as we extensively explain
in Section 8.3. We also remark that for such metrics, DBScan enables choosing the thresholds for the noise region appropriately simpler heuristics like selecting the top or bottom 10% of samples
as showing interesting behavior do not take the distribution of data
into account and may not be as effective in general.
In cases where the metric exhibits multiple clusters, the choice of
interesting region can only be supported by the knowledge of the
considered application, metric, and scenario. For example, in Figure 5, DBScan identifies two clusters C1, C2 and a noise region,
which confirms the visual intuition. In this case, we consider the interesting region to include cluster C2, since it represents samples in
which most externally initiated UDP connections are unanswered.
We analyze this in further detail in Section 8.2. More generally, the
interesting region could include a combination of multiple clusters
and noise regions.
6.3 Correlation Across Interesting Samples
Having identified the interesting samples for each metric, we employ several simple heuristics to identify correlations across the
samples, which in turn can aid making inferences of undesirable
behavior. We describe these below:
• Hosts dominating interesting samples: We consider the number
of distinct participating hosts (or IP addresses) to which the interesting samples for a given metric correspond. If the entire interesting cluster for a metric can be attributed to a small number of
participating hosts, it is an indication that the interesting behavior
is a property of those hosts. If however the interesting cluster is
spread among several hosts, it is an indication that the interesting
behavior is more general and not due to a few hosts.
• Correlations across metrics: We consider whether interesting behavior seen across multiple metrics are correlated, and are due to
the same underlying cause. We typically rely on domain knowledge to determine such correlations. For instance, in Section 8.2,
we used domain knowledge to reason that a large number of interesting samples seen in four of the metrics we considered were
directly related. Likewise, in Section 8.4, we isolate hosts that generate a large number of samples in the interesting region across
multiple metrics, and use these observations to reason about the
potential behavior of the hosts.
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7.2 Interesting Region Selection
In this section, we present the results of applying DBScan to our
dataset and the interesting regions we identified based on manual
inspection. For single cluster metrics, we simply selected the noise
region as interesting, as discussed in Section 6.2. Hence, we focus
on metrics that involved multiple clusters. As already stated, in case
multiple clusters are identified by DBScan, we use domain knowledge to manually select which clusters and noise regions constitute
the interesting region.
The sensitivity of the interesting regions was tested in our dataset
by splitting our day-long trace data into two halves and then running DBScan over each, as well as running DBScan over the entire
trace. One half corresponded to day-time activity and the other half
to night-time activity. For single cluster metrics, the results of clustering was similar, with only marginal changes to clusters’ width
and noise regions. The multiple clusters metrics, on the other hand,
had minor changes in clusters for some metrics, but overall, the final trend of the interesting regions was preserved. In the rest of the
section, we focus on clusters obtained using the entire trace.

Results

To illustrate how our approach performs with different system settings, we have conducted our analysis on both Kad and KadU. We
start by providing background about these systems, and highlight
key differences between them. This discussion helps in understanding the unique scenario we monitored. We then discuss results with
DBScan and interesting regions for various metrics.

7.2.1 Kad
In this section we present results for Kad, which are reported in Table 4. The first and second columns show metric name and transport protocol. The third column identifies a region as a cluster or
noise, in which we highlight the interesting one in bold. The fourth
column shows the actual range of sample values in each cluster,
while the fifth column reports the percentage of the samples that
are in the cluster. Finally, the last column shows the explanation
why the selected region is interesting.
We summarize key observations as follows:
• Samples with predominantly control messages: The first row of
Table 4 shows the clusters found by DBScan for the avg-pkt-sizeTCP metric. There are three clusters for this metric. Cluster C1
contains 16.28% of the samples, and it refers to samples whose
flows exhibited “small” average packet size. C3 corresponds on
the contrary to “large” average packet size, while C2 corresponds
to a cluster with “mid-sized” packets. These clusters correspond to
hosts exchanging mostly control messages, mostly data messages

7.1 High Level Characteristics of Kad and KadU Networks
In this section we provide high level background on the Kad and
KadU network characteristics highlighting key differences between
them.
• In contrast to Kad, KadU traffic typically stays within the ISP:
Kad clients mostly contact peers in the Internet while KadU clients
mostly contact peers within the ISP. The inout-ISP-to-Internet-ratio
metric was 1 for almost all KadU samples when UDP traffic was
considered. Interestingly, KadU clients did contact more peers in
the Internet when TCP traffic was considered. This was not entirely
expected and will be further investigated in Section 8.4.
• In contrast to Kad, KadU clients use default UDP/TCP ports:
When the dest-ports metric is considered, the median value of KadU
samples is 1, while it is 33 for Kad. This is because KadU clients
7

Table 4: Metrics with multiple clusters - Kad
Name
Type C/N
Range
percent Explanation
C1 [55 250] 16.28%
C2 [726 955] 17.05%
avg-pkt-size [Bytes] TCP C3 [956 1,348] 61.66% Primarily control
N [296 723] 5.01%
C1 [0 0.08] 36.14%
Left group
outin-fract-unanswered UDP C2 [0.93 1] 58.04% or home NAT
N [0.08 0.92] 5.82%
C1 [-1 -0.63] 17.98%
Left group
ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd UDP C2 [-0.62 0.45] 78.06% or home NAT
N
[0.5 1]
3.96%
C1
[0 0]
73.72%
inout-1024-dest-ports UDP C2
[1 1]
18.12% DDoS attack
N
[2 6]
8.16%
C1 [-1 -0.62] 13.49%
C2 [-0.4 0.62] 55.06%
ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd TCP C3 [0.62 1] 27.66% Selfish hosts
N [-0.62 -0.41] 3.79%

Table 5: Metrics with multiple clusters - KadU
Name
Type C/N
Range
percent
Explanation
C1 [0 0.62] 51.77%
inout-ISP-to-Internet-ratio TCP C2 [0.62 1] 48.23% Traffic within ISP
C1 [0 0.22] 33.82%
Left group
outin-fract-unanswered UDP C2
[0.8 1]
60.21% or home NAT
N [0.22 0.8] 5.97%
C1 [-1 -0.71] 49.42%
Left group
ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd UDP C2 [-0.25 0.37] 44.69% or home NAT
N
[0.37 1] 5.89%
C1 [0 0.32] 18.85% Left group or
fract-incoming-conn
UDP C2 [0.57 1] 75.58%
home NAT
N [0.32 0.56] 5.57%
C1
[0 0]
62.33% Left group or
outin-failure-ratio-TCP TCP C2
[1 1]
33.06%
home NAT
N [0.01 0.97] 4.61%
C1 [-1 -0.36] 5.61%
ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd TCP C2 [-0.36 1] 91.8%
Selfish hosts
N [-0.62 -0.36] 2.59%

Section 8.1 we investigate this metric further and present evidence
of a DDoS attack on DNS servers.
• Selfish versus seed behavior: Considering metric ratio-bytessent-to-rcvd-TCP, three clusters are shown. C1 represents samples
for hosts with selfish behavior (mostly receiving data), C2 represents samples for hosts that are both receiving and sending and C3
shows samples for hosts with seed behavior (mostly sending data).
Considering P2P file sharing application, a user is expected to contribute fairly to the community, so cluster C1 represents possibly
undesirable behavior.

and a mix of control and data messages respectively. Among those,
cluster C1 is interesting since it corresponds to samples where only
control messages were exchanged. This could be for benign reasons, for instance, a host that does not download or upload content.
But it could also indicate undesirable behavior, for instance a host
being part of a P2P botnet. One potential indication of malicious
activity is a host that is persistently sending only control messages
in all its samples. We did not find evidence of this in our trace,
leading us to believe there was no malicious activity.
• Samples of peers that do not reply to incoming requests: When
the outin-fract-unanswered-UDP metric is considered, it is striking
that there is a cluster (C2) with samples in the range 0.93 to 1 and
which includes 58.04% of the samples. This cluster correspond to
samples where almost every UDP flow initiated from the outside is
unanswered, indicating potentially anomalous behavior. Likewise,
considering the metric ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd-UDP, cluster C1
corresponds to samples where UDP packets are mostly received,
indicating again that the peer inside the MiniPoP is not responding
to external queries. These two clusters are related, and we analyze
further in Section 8.2.
• Communication with reserved ports: We consider metric inout1024-dest-ports-UDP, which the intuition suggests should be close
to 0, since P2P applications are not expected to run using a reserved
port. But both cluster C2 and the noise region N refers to values of
this metric larger than 0, accounting for 26.29% of the samples. In

7.2.2 KadU
In this section we focus on metrics where DBScan found multiple clusters for KadU metrics, which are reported in Table 5. We
summarize key observations as follows:
• Degree of communication within ISP: Here we focus on metric inout-ISP-to-Internet-ratio-TCP, for which DBScan found two
clusters. Cluster C2 corresponds to samples for which peers within
the ISP are predominantly contacted. Cluster C1 represents those
samples for which mostly peers in the Internet are contacted. The
presence of cluster C1 is not expected since KadU is optimized for
communication with peers inside the ISP. We further analyze C1
in Section 8.4.
• Samples of peers that do not reply to incoming requests: Like in
Kad, DBScan found cluster C2 for metric outin-fract-unanswered
8

Figure 7: For Kad metrics, fraction of samples in the interesting region versus fraction of clients generating them. Circled
are metrics with most relevant results.

Figure 8: For KadU metrics, fraction of samples in the interesting region versus fraction of clients generating them. Circled
are metrics with most relevant results.
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and cluster C1 for metric ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd for UDP, which
characterize peers that do not reply to incoming requests. In addition to these metrics, two more related metrics were found to have
multiple clusters in KadU which we believe is related to the same
issue. First, for metric fract-incoming-conn-UDP, cluster C2 contains all samples for which hosts mainly receive UDP flows. We
note the cluster had a prominent spike around 1, which indicates
that for a large number of samples, flows are only being received.
Second, for metric outin-failure-ratio-TCP, cluster C2 corresponds
to samples in which all incoming TCP connections failed. A detailed analysis is presented in Section 8.2.
• Selfish versus seed behavior: Metric ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd-TCP
has a very different distribution considering KadU, showing that the
large majority of peers have a seed-like behavior, which are clustered in C2. Also, there is a cluster of samples that suggests a
subset of peers act as selfish clients, not willing to share content.
We therefore select again this latter cluster as interesting.

Key Findings

In this section, we describe key findings obtained from our methodology. Section 8.1, presents evidence of DDoS attacks against DNS
servers. Section 8.2, shows how stale information in the system
causes UDP flows and TCP connections being initiated to hosts that
are not in the system or that cannot be reached due to NATs. Section 8.3, shows evidence of misbehaving eMule servers. Finally,
Section 8.4 present other interesting findings.
8.1 DDoS Attack - Kad
In this section, we describe our findings when studying metric inout1024-dest-ports-UDP, which was specifically added to observe undesirable traffic directed to reserved ports. Referring to Figure 7,
Kad clients contacted peers to restricted ports for 26.25% of the
samples, which is suspicious. We therefore isolated the samples in
the interesting regions and looked at the destination port of those
samples. It turns out that port 53 was the most common destination
port, receiving 1, 711 out of 3, 087 flows destined to port 1024 or
below. Note that no other port in the reserved range received more
than 175 flows in total.
We further investigated and verified that flows destined to UDP port
53 were valid Kad flows, and not actual DNS flows misclassified
by the DPI as Kad flows. Indeed, the UDP source port of the suspicious flows was generating and receiving Kad flows only. Moreover, the IP addresses of the most contacted peers were actual DNS
servers not managed by the ISP, but serving domains in countries
far away from the location of the MiniPoP. This ruled out the possibility of these flows being false positives of the flows identification
tool. Finally, we noticed that most of the suspicious flows were
unanswered, contrary to the normal Kad flows. To better highlight
this, Figure 9 shows the fraction of unanswered flows as a function
of the destination port number. Notice the spike at port 53, which
indicates that this port has a highest ratio of unanswered flows of
more than 90%. Other spikes refer to typical Kad ports found in
the dataset.
As a final observation, we noticed from Figure 7 that 25% of Kad
peers where generating the interesting samples for inout-1024-destports-UDP. To investigate further how prevalent this problem was,
Figure 10 shows the probability of Kad clients in the MiniPoP to
send flows to reserved ports (dotted line), and to port 53 (solid line)
among the reserved ports. Peers that send at least 10 flows to reserved ports are considered. The graph suggests that in general
reserved ports are rarely selected (P {port < 1024} < 2%). However, all hosts that do send flows to reserved ports are likely to target
port 53 with very high probability (P {port = 53|port < 1024} ≥

7.3 Host Distribution in Interesting Regions
Having identified the interesting regions, we next consider the number of distinct participating hosts (or IP addresses) to which the
samples correspond. If the entire interesting region for a metric
can be attributed to a small number of participating hosts, it is an
indication that those hosts are particularly abnormal. If however
the interesting cluster is spread among several hosts, it is an indication that the interesting behavior is more general and not due a few
hosts.
Figure 7 shows, for each Kad metric, a point reporting the fraction
of hosts that generate 90% of the samples versus the fraction of
samples in the interesting region. For example, metric inout-1024dest-ports for UDP has 26% of its samples in the interesting range.
90% of these interesting samples have been generated by 24% of
the hosts running Kad. We have circled those metrics for which we
present key findings later. In addition, a similar plot is shown for
KadU in Figure 8.
We focus on metrics in the right side of Figures 7 and 8, which correspond to those with large fraction of interesting samples spread
across many hosts. These metrics are the most interesting and we
present and discuss our findings on them in Section 8. For most
metrics in the bottom left of the figures, corresponding to those
with interesting samples generated by a few hosts, we found the
causes were usually benign and did not point to undesirable activity. However, a few cases deserve to be mentioned and we discuss
them further in Section 8.
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Figure 11: Host leaves the group about 11 hours after the beginning of the trace. Fraction of unanswered flows on the top
and total number of unanswered flows on the bottom.

Figure 9: Fraction of unanswered flows per destination port

ing connection attempts. Roughly 50% were due to KadU. Recall
that for Kad peers, no incoming TCP connection is possible due to
the ISP NAT.
Having a large number of failed TCP connections or UDP flows is
undesirable not only from the perspective of the introduced traffic,
but also (and more importantly) from the state that may need to be
maintained by various devices in the network (such as NATs and
firewalls), and the computation required of them.
We believe there are two key reasons for unanswered flows. First,
some P2P participants are behind home NATs. Other peers may
learn about these participants through P2P membership management mechanisms, and may (unsuccessfully) attempt to communicate with them. Second, when a host leaves a P2P system, other
peers may continue to attempt contacting it due to stale information
in the P2P network.
Figure 11 shows an example of a host that left the group, but which
continues to receive packets for more than 14 hours after its departure. The top plot shows the time series for outin-fract-unansweredUDP. Note the sharp transition from 0 to 1 which corresponds
to node departure. The bottom plot depicts the total number of
unanswered incoming UDP flows. Over 60 flows per minute are
received during the next 2.5 hours, after which about 1 flow per
minute is still observed for several hours until the end of the trace.
We believe the large duration for which stale membership information remains in the network is a concern, and the P2P system must
be better optimized to maintain up-to-date membership information.
We have devised simple heuristics to identify flows that are unanswered due to the departure of a host. This is based on the observation that a host that leaves the group will not initiate any new UDP
or TCP flows in contrast to hosts behind NAT which are likely to
initiate flows to other peers. We found that host departure is responsible for 41% and 48% of the unanswered UDP flows for Kad
and KadU respectively, and the remainder are due to hosts behind
home NATs. For failing TCP connections, 75% were sent to hosts
that appear to have left the group. These results indicate that both
factors (node departure and home NATs) play an important role in
explaining the results.
Overall, these results indicate that better mechanisms must be designed to handle stale group membership, and hosts behind NATs
for a P2P system to exhibit more friendly behavior to network operators. In particular, it is important for membership management
algorithms to avoid propagating hosts behind NAT, and to ensure
stale information is eliminated in a timely fashion.

Figure 10: Probability of initiating flows to specific ports for
the Kad peers that send more than 10 flows to reserved ports.

30%).
We believe this shows evidence of a DDoS attack to well known
DNS servers exploiting the Kad network, which has been reported
in [3, 38]. In fact, the top most destination in our trace was mentioned in [3] as being under attack. In such attack, a malicious
client in the Kad network, will spread contact information (IP address and port) about the victim DNS server as if it were part of
the Kad network. Later, innocent clients send regular Kad messages to the DNS server. Similar attacks have also been shown
in [10,13,20,31,33] in more general scenarios. Note that the KadU
network was not found to be involved in any DDoS attack, thank to
its “closed” nature.
8.2 Wasted Resources - Kad and KadU
Consider the 3 metrics on the top right corner of Figure 8. These
correspond to outin-fract-unanswered-UDP, fract-incoming-connUDP, and ratio-bytes-sent-to-rcvd-UDP. For each metric, 40% to
60% of the samples are in the interesting region, and about 60%
of the KadU hosts are involved. The same three metrics are also
highlighted in Figure 7 when considering Kad.
This clearly indicates some unexpected behavior, and points to a
potentially significant problem. Investigating further, we observed
that all metrics hint to a large number of UDP flows incoming to
the MiniPoP that are never answered. In particular, 28% of UDP
flows coming to the MiniPoP are unanswered, and 65% of this is
due to Kad and KadU clients.
A similar unexpected high fraction of TCP failures is highlighted
by the methodology applied to outin-failure-ratio-TCP in the KadU
dataset. Investigating further, 116, 000 TCP connections coming to
the MiniPoP are failing, which account for 30% of all TCP incom10
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Figure 12: Connections made by the KadU client h1 towards
Server1 (fake server) and Server2 (full server)

8.3 Fake Servers and Full Servers - Kad and KadU
In this section we describe our findings when studying the metric avg-conn-per-IP-TCP. The interesting region for this metric in
both Kad and KadU corresponds to samples where a peer contacts
the same destination host more than once within a sample time
window. We found that 94% of the interesting samples for KadU
dataset were generated by only two hosts. In the following, we
focus our analysis on one of the hosts which we call h1, with the
results being similar for the other host.
We found that h1 generated a large number of flows to two servers,
namely Server1 and Server2. Figure 12 shows the number of
connections h1 initiated to these servers during the whole trace.
The X axis shows the connection start time, and the Y axis shows
the connection ID. Positive IDs show connections opened to Server1,
while negative IDs show connections opened to Server2. The average connection duration is 15 and 8 seconds respectively. For
periods when the host was active, the inter-connection time to both
servers is relatively small, i.e., 51 and 63 seconds for Server1 and
Server2 respectively.
To further understand this behavior, we searched for information on
the IP address of both servers and found that Server1 was reported
as a fake server and Server2 was reported as a full server [2]. A
fake server pretends to be a legitimate eMule server to fool clients
with the goal of spying on them and to inject false information to
disrupt the P2P system. These servers might be planted by parties such as the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) [9]. Fake servers may also impact the performance of victim
peers since such peers cannot exploit the eMule network to search
and exchange content. A full server is a legitimate server that has
reached the maximum number of clients it can serve, so that further requests are denied. We believe the list of servers that host h1
has is limited, and possibly contains Server1 and Server2 only.
This would result in h1 persistently initiating connections to both
servers.
Considering the Kad dataset, the methodology pointed out an analogous problem. 92% of the interesting samples in the avg-connper-IP-TCP metric were generated by a single host. Once again,
we found the host had a large number of connections to a particular peer. Interestingly, we could not confirm from available manually maintained lists that this peer was a fake or full server, and
we believe this is a hitherto unknown fake server. In general, we
believe a traffic analysis approach such as ours can help in automatically identifying or inferring servers/peers with suspicious behavior, rather than relying entirely on manually maintained lists.
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In this section we present some other examples of the findings highlighted by our methodology:
• Inter ISP traffic - KadU: As mentioned in Section 7.1, metric
inout-ISP-to-Internet-ratio-TCP for KadU shows a cluster in the
range 0 to 0.62, with the majority of samples in the range 0 to 0.03.
This represent clients where a large fraction of the connections was
directed to peers in the Internet. In fact, 20% of the P2P traffic
incoming to the MiniPoP is sent from the Internet. While some of
the behavior is caused by clients that are searching for content not
present in the KaU network, we believe there are several clients not
using the KadU network to search. This is an undesirable behavior
considering that the KadU developers optimized KadU to maintain
P2P traffic within the ISP.
• Abnormal behavior with "buddy" maintenance mechanisms - KadU:
The metrics outin-avg-conn-per-IP-TCP and outin-total-conn-attemptsUDP highlighted an atypical region for which a host was receiving
a lot of TCP and UDP flows in the KadU dataset. By investigating the anomalous samples, we have found a single host which was
responsible for 57% and 33% of interesting samples respectively.
We looked further and found that a single external peer opened 825
TCP connections and 1, 678 UDP connections to this host in a 25
hours period. Looking at the message type exchanged among these
two peers which were logged by the packet analyzer, we discovered that messages were related to the eMule "buddy" mechanism.
In this mechanism, a client behind a (home) NAT finds a “public”
peer (or buddy) who forwards requests from other clients to the
NATted peer, so that it can then directly initiate a connection to the
client requesting the content. This allows NAT clients to upload
content. We believe the large number of connections initiated by
this client in our trace is atypical and points to limitations in the
Kad/KadU protocol to overcome NAT/Firewall restrictions.
• Isolating very active peers - Kad and KadU: Our methodology
pointed out potentially interesting peers which account for a large
number of interestng samples in several metrics. We isolated the
hosts responsible for more than 10% of the interesting samples for
at least 5 metrics, finding 3 KadU peers and 6 Kad peers. For example, a client was generating many interesting samples for metrics
live-conn-TCP, inout-total-conn-attempts-UDP and bps-rcvd-TCP,
which show the host was aggressively searching and downloading
content. Similar results were observed for other clients. While we
did not find evidence of malicious activity, we believe our methodology was able to isolate very aggressive behavior, which can be
important from the ISP point of view.
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Related Work

Many recent works have focused on P2P traffic classification. In
general, two main approaches have emerged: packet inspection
techniques [6, 25] and behavioural classification techniques [14,
18, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30]. Our work aims at analyzing the subset of
traffic which has been already classified as P2P to identify any undesirable behaviour these systems might have.
Anomaly detection of network traffic in general [1, 8, 28, 35] is
widely studied. While many of these techniques can be leveraged
in our context, our work is distinguished by the extensive use of
P2P domain knowledge, and use of many metrics that are specific
to P2P systems. Further, our notion of undesirable behaviour is
broad, and includes not only malicious activities, but also many
other patterns of undesirable behavior peculiar to P2P systems, for
e.g. wasted resources caused by NATs and stale information in the
system (Section 8.2).
Our work both corroborates known patterns of undesirable behaviour
in P2P systems, and provides more insights into them. In particular,

our findings on DDoS corroborate recent works where researchers
showed the feasibility of exploiting P2P systems to launch DDoS
attacks on the Internet [10,13,20,31]. While these works proposed
attack heuristics and showed the feasibility of attacks, our work is
one of the first to show evidence of real attacks taking place in the
wild. Our findings on fake servers corroborate [9]. Our results
(Section 8.3) have not only shown peers impacted by well-known
fake servers [4, 32], but also shown the potential to automatically
detect hitherto unknown fake servers. Finally, some recent works
like [16, 37] discuss how to design ISP friendly P2P systems. In
this paper, we report findings on actual analysis of KadU, a deployed ISP friendly P2P system.
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Conclusions

In this paper, we have shown the importance and potential of systematic analysis of P2P traffic in uncovering potential undesirable
behavior that such systems may exhibit. Undesirable behavior refers
both to aspects that impact the performance of the P2P system, as
well as atypical traffic that can potentially harm the network.
We focus on offline analysis and adopt a semi-automated analysis
methodology. Our approach assumes the availability of flow-level
records, where flows corresponding to the P2P system of interest
are clearly identifiable. Flow-level records are aggregated into perhost samples. The samples are grouped into coarse clusters through
use of clustering algorithms. Interesting clusters are then manually
analyzed, exploiting the domain knowledge of the target scenario.
Our methodology applied to real traffic traces collected from a nationalwide ISP highlights several patterns of undesirable behavior,
which may be of interest to network operators, P2P system developers, and actual end-users of the systems. In particular:
• We show evidence of real DDoS attacks being conducted on DNS
servers by exploiting P2P systems, and show their prevalence in
live deployments.
• We show that stale membership information and presence of hosts
behind Network Address Translators (NATs) can result in failure
of 15% of TCP connections and 18% of UDP flows incoming to
the PoP. This may hurt peer performance, introduce unnecessary
traffic, and may unnecessarily consume significant computation resources of state-full network devices, such as firewalls or NAT
boxes.
• We pinpoint maliciously deployed servers that can subvert the
performance of hosts participating in the P2P system, by injecting
fake information or by spying on peers activity.
While the results are very promising, in the future we aim at generalizing the approach and at improving the methodology. The final
goal is to design a methodology that can be applied to monitor the
target P2P system in real time, and to automatically present a much
reduced subset of interesting observations to be further manually
investigated.
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